CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE CHINA Y ASIA-PACÍFICO
UNIVERSIDAD DEL PACÍFICO

SHARPENING THE GENDER LENS ON CHINESE INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

WORKING PAPERS SERIES

Sharpening the Gender Lens on Chinese Investment in Latin America: The Case of Colombia

Kehan Wang, Elisa Arond and Nifta Lau



About this initiative

The ***Sharpening the Gender Lens on Chinese Investment in Latin America*** project examines how gender dynamics intersect with the growing presence of Chinese investment in Latin America, with particular attention to the mining sector in Peru and Colombia. Led by the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies (CECHAP) at Universidad del Pacífico, the project brings together research on public policy, corporate practices, international standards, and the experiences of women in mining-affected territories.

The project starts from a central question: as Chinese companies become increasingly important actors in Latin America's mining sectors, and participate more in global corporate responsibility initiatives, how are gender considerations incorporated into the governance of their investments? The research finds considerable variation across companies and countries, challenging the idea of a single "Chinese model." Corporate practices are shaped by the interaction of Chinese overseas investment guidelines, host-country institutions, international industry standards, and company-level decisions.

The project team is led by principal researcher Kehan Wang, with Nifta Lau, Alicia Zegarra and the research assistance of Lucciana Rengifo. This working paper series presents their principal findings from Peru and Colombia, alongside evidence from Chinese mining policies and overseas investment regulations and a review of the existing literature. Together, the papers identify advances as well as persistent gaps in gender governance, particularly beyond workplace equality and in mining-affected communities, and consider how governments, companies, civil society, and international organizations can strengthen gender-responsive governance of extractive investment.

How to cite (APA Style 7th Edition)

Wang, K., Arond, E., & Lau, N. (2026). *Sharpening the gender lens on Chinese investment in Latin America: The case of Colombia*. Sharpening the Gender Lens on Chinese Investment in Latin America (Working Paper Series). Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies, Universidad del Pacífico.

Abstract

This report examines gender governance in Chinese mining investment in Colombia as part of the broader project "Sharpening the Gender Lens: Examining China's Investments in Latin America." Colombia offers an emerging but important case: its economic ties with China have historically been weaker than those of other major Latin American countries, but Chinese firms have recently become more visible in infrastructure, energy, electromobility, and mining. At the same time, Colombia has been redefining its extractive and energy policies through ambitious goals for a more just energy transition.

The report argues that gender should be understood as a matter of territorial governance. Existing evidence from Colombia shows that mining and energy projects affect women through informal and indirect economies, environmental risks, community participation, compensation, and mine closure. The cases of Zijin's Buriticá gold mine and JCHX's El Alacrán copper-gold-silver project illustrate two different moments of Chinese mining investment: one operating project where some gender-related practices can be identified, and one developing project where gender-sensitive governance could still be incorporated early. The report concludes that for Colombia, value lies in this unfinished moment: gender concerns can still be integrated into licensing, consultation, formalization, procurement, and territorial development before future projects reproduce older extractive inequalities.

Table of Contents

Introduction **4**

1. Gender Governance in Colombia's Mining Industry and Energy Transition **6**

2. Gender in Colombia's Mining and Energy Territories **7**

2.1. Employment and the Gendered Division of Labor **7**

2.2. Gendered Impacts of Coal Mine Closure **9**

2.3. Participation, Agency, and Decision-making **10**

3. Chinese Investment in Colombia's Mining Sector **11**

3.1. China–Colombia Economic Relations and Mining-Energy Investment **11**

3.2. Zijin Continental Gold and Buriticá **12**

3.3. JCHX and El Alacrán **14**

4. Gaps, Risks, and Opportunities **16**

5. Recommendations **17**

6. Conclusion **18**

Bibliography **20**

“Sharpening the Gender Lens on Chinese Investment in Latin America: The Case of Colombia”

Kehan Wang, Elisa Arond y Nifta Lau

Introduction

China’s economic ties with Colombia have traditionally been weaker than with other major Latin American countries, but recent developments show a change. In recent years, Chinese companies have increasingly invested in sectors like infrastructure, energy, electromobility, and mining. Although Chinese FDI made up only 0.4% of Colombia's total inward FDI from 2001 to 2020, it grew significantly (by 138%) from 2023 to 2025, increasing from US$64.2 million to $152 million (Defelipe and Díaz, 2026). Additionally, Colombia joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative in 2025 to bolster trade and investment ties with China. This evolving partnership is happening at a crucial time, as President Gustavo Petro (2022-2026) reevaluates Colombia’s extractive and energy policies, aiming to reduce fossil fuel dependence, boost renewable energy, and explore opportunities in strategic minerals within a just energy transition framework. Whether these efforts will continue under his successor, Abelardo de la Espriella (2026-2030), remains uncertain.

This report is part of the project titled “Sharpening the Gender Lens: Examining China’s Investments in Latin America,” coordinated by the Center for China and Asia-Pacific Studies (CECHAP) at the Universidad del Pacífico. As part of the broader research and policy dialogue initiative “Capitalizing on the New Climate Economy in the Americas,” the project examines how Chinese investment in South America’s extractive and renewable energy sectors affects gender dynamics, particularly the lives and opportunities of women, and how these impacts can be managed more equitably. In its initial stages, the project focuses on two main countries, Peru and Colombia. This report explores the gender aspects of Chinese mining investments in Colombia, while a more detailed report focuses on Peru (Wang, Lau and Zegarra, 2026).

Colombia is an important case precisely because it does not fit neatly into the same pattern as its neighboring countries in terms of Chinese involvement in the mining industry. Mining is not new to Colombia. Gold mining has deep historical roots, coal has played a central role in the country’s export economy, and nickel is part of its large-scale production, concentrated in the Cerro Matoso operation. However, the structure and political economy of mining in Colombia differ from those of countries such as Peru and Chile, where large-scale metallic mining has long been more central to national development strategies and the governance of foreign investment. In Colombia, mining has been shaped by a combination of formal large-scale operations, artisanal and informal mining, illegal economies, armed conflicts, territorial disputes, and an uneven state presence (Baraybar, Hidalgo & Dargent, 2020).

Major Chinese mining companies have recently established themselves in this complex landscape. Two notable examples are Zijin Mining Group Co., a major state-owned enterprise that operates the Buriticá gold mine in Antioquia, following its acquisition of Continental Gold, and JCHX Mining Management Co., a private Chinese firm that recently acquired the El Alacrán project in Córdoba, which will produce copper, gold, and silver and aligns more closely with Colombia’s strategic minerals agenda. While gold is not categorized as a transition mineral, the global demand for the yellow metal is also high in times of economic uncertainty, and Buriticá serves as an early case of Chinese corporate mining governance in Colombia. These examples illustrate two different scenarios of Chinese mining involvement: one where

the mine is already operational, showing gender-related practices, and another that is still in development, offering an opportunity to incorporate gender-sensitive governance before social and environmental arrangements are embedded.

Colombia offers an emerging but important case for studying gender and Chinese mining investment. Unlike Peru, where Chinese companies already operate several large mining projects, Colombia's Chinese mining presence is still relatively new and limited. For this reason, this report does not aim to provide a definitive assessment of gender outcomes. Instead, the report uses Colombia as a case for mapping and agenda-setting. It asks what can be learned from existing evidence on gender in mining-energy territories, what Chinese investment adds to the governance picture, and what should be addressed before future mining and renewable energy projects reproduce and deepen existing exclusions and inequalities.

The report views gender not only as an issue of women's employment in mining but also as a matter of territorial governance. Gender disparities in the mining sector are evident not only in inequality and exclusion within formal employment but also extend to subcontracted work, informal service sectors, resettlement, livelihoods, participation in community decision-making, compensation, environmental governance, and mine closures. In Colombia's coal regions, women's livelihoods are often linked to indirect economies that are easily overlooked when policies focus solely on formal workers. For future mineral projects, women's involvement in consultation, local development planning, and benefit-sharing will be crucial for making mining governance more inclusive and equitable.

The report proceeds as follows. Section two situates Colombia's mining industry within the context of the energy transition, with attention to coal, strategic minerals, and the mining governance framework. Section three reviews key gender issues in Colombia's mining and energy sectors. Section four examines Chinese investment in Colombia's mining and energy transition and discusses two Chinese mining cases: Zijin's Buriticá mine and JCHX's El Alacrán project. The final sections identify key gaps and opportunities and offer recommendations for building a more gender-responsive research and policy agenda.

1. Gender Governance in Colombia's Mining Industry and Energy Transition

Colombia has a relatively comprehensive policy framework for gender equality in mining, energy, and environmental protection. Like many countries in the region, it has established numerous institutions and policies that emphasize social inclusion, human rights, and participation in natural resource governance and beyond. At the national level, Colombia has established various tools, both within and outside the mining and energy sectors, to shape gender equality policies.

The most important sector-specific tool is the Gender Guidelines for the Mining and Energy Sector (Ministerio de Minas y Energía and IDB, 2020). These Guidelines aim to integrate gender considerations throughout public institutions and private firms via four key pillars: boosting women's participation in employment, leadership, community spaces, and value chains; fostering workplace cultures rooted in equality and shared care responsibilities; enhancing institutional coordination and incentive mechanisms; and preventing violence against women in workplaces and communities impacted by mining and energy projects (Martínez-Restrepo et al., 2022). While not legally binding, the Guidelines serve as a vital reference for companies and public agencies aiming to adopt gender-sensitive practices.

Efforts to boost gender inclusion have also surfaced through voluntary initiatives within the private sector. A comprehensive study across the sector involving 71 mining, energy, and hydrocarbon companies offers a valuable baseline for current practices (Martínez-Restrepo et al., 2022). Participants reported progress in workplace safety, anti-harassment policies, and maternity leave support beyond legal standards. However, significant gaps persist in professional growth, work-life balance, and women's roles in supply chains. Only a few companies reported factoring gender considerations into supplier selection or assessing suppliers based on gender equity. These results indicate that although workforce diversity is becoming more prominent, broader economic inclusion remains limited.

Apart from individual company efforts, industry groups also aim to advance gender equality. "Energy that Transforms: Mining-Energy Alliance for Gender Equity" (*Energía que transforma: Alianza minero energética para la equidad de género*), backed by the Inter-American Development Bank, unites firms and associations from the mining, energy, and hydrocarbon sectors to exchange best practices and set shared goals (Insuco, 2020). Likewise, the Colombian Mining Association (ACM), representing most large and medium-sized mining firms nationally, has launched various initiatives to promote compliance standards and recognize women's contributions in mining (HuEllas Award) (Asociación Colombiana de Minería, n.d.). Additionally, mining companies frequently include gender-related initiatives or metrics in their sustainability reports. These efforts mostly focus on increasing women's workforce participation, fostering gender-sensitive suppliers, and providing training or empowerment programs for women.

Growing attention to gender in mining governance coincides with broader efforts to transform Colombia's energy and extractive sectors. Colombia has extensive experience in extractive industries, though not as much as some regional counterparts. The country has historically ranked among the top five global exporters of thermal coal, but its standing is now less secure due to several factors. These include importing countries' increased climate ambitions and the closure of coal-fired power plants, Colombia's own commitments, such as joining the Powering Past Coal Alliance, the lack of Pacific ports for Asian exports, and other geopolitical issues (Arond et al., 2024; Vega-Araújo et al., 2023). Additionally, Colombia has exported oil and gas, but the Petro government planned to phase out this sector as well, including joining the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2023a).

Two policy instruments play a key role here. Colombia's National Economic and Social Policy Council issued CONPES 4075 (2022), establishing the country's official National Energy Transition Policy with a strategic roadmap spanning 2022 to 2028. Complementing this framework, the Ministry of Mines and Energy introduced the Roadmap for a Just Energy Transition (*Hoja de Ruta para la Transición Energética Justa*). This initiative presents a broader, decentralized, and socially inclusive vision designed to democratize the nation's cleaner energy future (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2025). Unlike purely technical decarbonization strategies, the Petro government´s approach explicitly considers social, territorial, and labor aspects, aiming for a more equitable distribution of benefits and costs.

Strategic minerals are crucial to this vision. The roadmap underscores Colombia's significant potential in key minerals like copper, nickel, and iron, seeking to leverage this economic opportunity through an approach focused on environmental justice, national sovereignty, and sustainability (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2025; Mariño Miranda et al., 2024). Besides extraction, policymakers highlighted the importance of developing domestic value chains, promoting local industrialization, formalizing informal mining activities, and increasing state involvement through initiatives such as ECOMINERALES (Empresa Colombiana de Minerales). This proposed state-owned mining enterprise aimed to manage strategic transition minerals and lead formalization efforts (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026). These initiatives were intended to position mining not only as an export resource but also as part of a broader strategy for economic diversification and productive transformation.

Importantly, gender gained some traction in Colombia's discourse on energy transition in the Petro administration. The Roadmap for a Just Energy Transition was shaped by territorial and sectoral dialogues, including a specific session on Women, Gender, and Diversity (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2023b). The Mining-Energy Planning Unit (*Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética*, UPME) in the Colombian government conducted studies that emphasize women as vital participants in the transition and advocate for a more intersectional and territorial approach to understanding gender inequalities (Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética [UPME], n.d.). These efforts acknowledge that women experience mining and energy transitions differently, particularly in terms of employment, unpaid care work, community involvement, and access to economic opportunities.

Nevertheless, there remains a long way to go from recognition to implementation. Petro administration's governance framework had increasingly recognized the importance of gender equality, particularly through sectoral guidelines, voluntary business initiatives, and the justice-oriented language of the energy transition. However, as the country inaugurated a new presidency and continues to seek to expand strategic mineral production and attract new investment, it remains to be seen how, or to what extent, the mining sector will confront long-standing gendered challenges that policy recognition alone cannot solve. These challenges are rooted in the everyday organization of mining territories. The next section examines these experiences in greater detail.

2. Gender in Colombia's Mining and Energy Territories

2.1. Employment and the Gendered Division of Labor

Formal employment is the most visible dimension of gender dynamics in the mining and energy sectors. Despite recent progress, women remain a minority in mining and related extractive industries. According to the latest available Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Report for 2022, the 32

extractive companies that reported figures employed 116,908 workers, of whom 95,666 were men (81.8%), and 21,242 were women (18.2%) (EITI Colombia, 2025: 94). Compared with 2021, women's employment among reporting companies increased by 12.3%, adding 2,335 jobs. This was notable given that total employment in the sector grew by only 6.1% during the same period. However, women's participation varied sharply across subsectors. In mining, women accounted for only 11.1% of total direct and indirect employment, while in hydrocarbons they accounted for 21.9%, much of it in indirect roles.

Table 1. Gender-segregated Employment Data in Colombia's Mining and Energy Sectors

Hydrocarbons		**2021**	**2022**
	Direct employment - Male	9,711	9,654
	Direct employment - Woman	3,540	3,688
	Indirect employment - Man	51,551	50,392
	Indirect Employment - Women	11,896	13,111
	Total hydrocarbons	76,698	76,845
Mining		2021	2022
	Direct employment - Male	13,425	15,454
	Direct employment - Woman	1,327	1,755
	Indirect employment - Man	16,598	20,166
	Indirect Employment - Women	2,144	2,688
	Total mining	33,494	40,063
Total extractive sector		110,192	116,908

Source: EITI Colombia (2025: 94; Table 33) based on figures reported by government and trade associations to EITI Colombia.

These figures suggest both progress and persistent segregation. Women's participation has increased, yet the mining-energy sector remains organized around a gendered division of labor. In many regions of Colombia, extractive industries are embedded in patriarchal systems that assign paid, productive labor to men and reproductive labor to women, despite the presence of women workers in the sector. Mining and coal have often been constructed as masculine spaces, where men occupy decision-making and technical roles inside and outside the mine, while women are concentrated in administrative, service, informal, or "white-collar" and "pink-collar" jobs (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2012; 2014; González Colonia, 2017; Lahiri-Dutt, 2022; Mohr, 2021; Pasaribu and Lahiri-Dutt, 2022; Sikweyiya et al., 2022; Ulloa, 2016; Vargas-Guevara et al., 2022; Villamizar and Jerez, 2020).

This gender division restricts women's access to higher-paying, more stable, and technical jobs and discourages them from pursuing roles culturally associated with men, such as mechanics (Villamizar and Jerez, 2020). Simultaneously, male dominance in mining not only confers privilege but also subjects men to greater exposure to occupational hazards, work-related health issues, and the social pressures of being a provider in extractive economies (Martínez-Restrepo et al., 2022).

2.2. Gendered Impacts of Coal Mine Closure

Mining impacts the social fabric of regions by changing economic structures, local services, mobility, and household organization. These effects occur throughout a mine's lifecycle, from development to closure. When a mine closes, it affects not only workers but also supporting services and regional economies, creating ripple effects across gender, age, and ethnicity (Cock, 2019; Watson, 2023; Mohr et al., 2023). In Colombia, coal mine closures have already shaped lived experiences—some groups face forced immobility, stranded in towns dominated by a single industry with no alternatives, while others are compelled to migrate externally under precarious conditions. Closure can exacerbate existing inequalities and introduce new vulnerabilities.

Women are particularly vulnerable as they are often overrepresented in indirect mining economies. Activities such as food sales, domestic work, laundry, room rentals, small-scale commerce, and other services to the mining workforce can be significant income sources for women, but these are rarely acknowledged as part of the formal mining sector. When mining activity diminishes, these livelihoods may vanish without being reflected in labor statistics, compensation schemes, or transition plans. This situation exemplifies what the literature calls "double precarity": a loss of economic independence combined with limited mobility due to caregiving duties and deep-seated gender roles (Velicu & Barca, 2020; Sovacool et al., 2020). An illustrative case is women in La Jagua de Ibirico, Cesar. After Prodeco's coal mines shut down, many women lost their income sources, but due to a lack of skills for other sectors and family caregiving responsibilities, many remained trapped in poverty with few migration options (Ángel, 2019; Torres, 2024; Holguín, 2020; Oei et al., 2020).

Existing research indicates that extractive economies tend to perpetuate traditional gender roles, fostering concepts like "hypermasculinities," which are associated with the strengthening of male provider roles (Sikweyiya et al., 2022), and "petromasculinities," a form of masculinity rooted in fossil fuel industries, patriarchal authority, and political influence (Daggett, 2018; 2021). In the Department of Cesar, Vargas-Guevara et al. (2022) noted that before coal mining, agrarian systems had a less clearly defined gender division of labor. Mining has reinforced masculine provider identities and is linked to rises in violence, including femicides and sexual exploitation. For women, mining has often meant increased reproductive burdens, such as caring for children and relatives affected by environmental damage caused by mining activities. Additionally, the decline and closure of mining operations disrupt established gender roles, causing men's anxieties and identity reconfigurations that further marginalize women's roles in community decision-making (Verweijen et al., 2024).

Gendered impacts are further differentiated by ethnicity, race, and class. Rural women in Cesar and other coal-producing regions may face "double or triple layers of marginalization" as women, rural residents, and victims of armed conflicts (Bermúdez Rico et al., 2012). Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities also encounter overlapping injustices. For these groups, mine closures mean not just loss of

employment, but also worsen historical patterns of marginalization, such as cultural dislocation, political exclusion, and land-based livelihood erosion due to mining pollution (Gilbert et al., 2021).

2.3. Participation, Agency, and Decision-making

Decision-making in mining territories can involve consultation processes, formal negotiations with companies and state institutions, the design of local economic diversification, and community planning for public services and land. Women, men, and marginalized groups do not enter these spaces as neutral actors. Their roles are mediated by histories of exclusion, colonial legacies, armed conflicts, and corporate practices that categorize communities and divide members within them. Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and peasant women often face particular difficulties in defending their rights, especially where rights to prior consultation have been violated or insufficiently guaranteed by state institutions (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2012).

Traditional gender roles further restrict women's participation. Expectations that women assume domestic and care work rather than formal employment reduce their opportunities to participate in unions, negotiations, or advocacy spaces (Mohr, 2021). Men are often framed as providers and "natural" participants in negotiations, while women may be dismissed as too emotional, inexperienced, or inappropriate for public deliberation, especially when they are young. These roles are shaped by both local customs and external actors, including mining companies and municipal institutions, which often prioritize negotiations with older men and actively marginalize women and young people (Vargas-Guevara et al., 2022).

In the Department of Cesar in Northern Colombia, for example, women have been systematically excluded from mining decision-making through various forms of violence, dispossession, and delegitimization (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2012). Coal mining heightened political violence, involving private security forces and the presence of guerrilla, military, and paramilitary groups in the areas nearby, causing significant harm to both women and men (Moor and Van de Sandt, 2014; Vargas-Guevara et al., 2022). These effects include the disruption of women's activism against mining through direct violence (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2012; Vargas-Guevara et al., 2022), as well as vicarious violence—such as experiencing grief and consequences from the murder of their husbands, or being pressured to cease activism through threats to their children's safety or employment (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2014).

Women are not only victims of exclusion but also active participants in defending the environment and challenging extractive industries in many mining regions. Despite quotas in companies, unions, and formal spaces to improve their role in decision-making (Ulloa, 2016), their participation is more strongly tied to informal community leadership and grassroots activism (Bermúdez-Rico et al., 2012; 2014; Mohr, 2021; Ulloa, 2016). In Cesar, women frequently lead efforts to protect natural resources and advocate for local autonomy in areas affected by coal mining (Vargas-Guevara et al., 2022). Particularly, working-class, rural, and Indigenous women have redefined traditional gender roles, such as those of mothers and caregivers, as forms of political agency (Hylton, 2021; Karlsson, 2023). Rather than remaining confined to domestic roles, many women have entered public life through gender and environmental justice movements, viewing their activism as an extension of their responsibilities to care for children, homes, and future generations (Barry, 2012).

Taken together, these experiences show that gender in Colombia's mining and energy sectors is more than a matter of labor-market inclusion. It is also about cultural traditions, livelihoods, violence, and political

voice. These long-standing challenges shape the social landscape into which Chinese mining and energy investments are entering.

3. Chinese Investment in Colombia's Mining Sector

Chinese investment in Colombia's mining sector remains limited compared with that in other South American countries such as Peru, Chile, or Argentina, but it has become more visible in recent years. As Colombia's broader economic relationship with China warms, Chinese firms have entered two strategically important mining projects: Zijin Continental Gold's Buriticá gold mine in Antioquia and JCHX's El Alacrán copper-gold-silver project in Córdoba. These two cases represent different stages of Chinese mining investment in Colombia. Buriticá is already operating and offers some evidence of corporate ESG and gender-related practices. El Alacrán is still in development and shows how gender-sensitive governance could be incorporated earlier, before community agreements and local procurement arrangements become fixed.

3.1. China–Colombia Economic Relations and Mining-Energy Investment

Colombia's economic relationship with China has historically been more limited and less institutionalized than that of several other major Latin American economies. Colombia's ties with China have often been described as "superficial," while the country's policy toward China has been characterized as opportunistic, reactive, unstable, and ambiguous (Velosa, 2019; Colombia Risk Analysis, 2023). Despite recent efforts to elevate the bilateral relationship to a "strategic partnership" and Colombia's eventual accession to the Belt and Road Initiative, the relationship has not yet evolved into a deeply structured economic or geopolitical partnership (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

Trade and investment have grown from modest levels and remain uneven. Over time, trade has grown significantly, but Colombia's trade deficit with China has also widened markedly, from US$58.7 million FOB in 1995 to US$16.51 billion FOB in 2025 (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística [DANE], n.d.). In 2023, Colombian exports to China were dominated by mineral products and metals, with fossil fuels accounting for over 60% of exports. Meanwhile, imports from China were diverse, including manufactured goods and technology products (Observatory of Economic Complexity [OEC], 2024). Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) has increased substantially since 2020. Prior to that, Chinese FDI accounted for just 0.4 percent of Colombia's total FDI (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026). Between 2021 and 2023, it grew by 138 percent, from US$64.2 million to US$152 million, driven mainly by infrastructure and clean energy projects (Quiceno, 2024). Despite this growth, from 2000 to 2024, Colombia received only 3.32 percent of China's total FDI in Latin America, even though it is the region's fourth-largest economy (Dussel Peters, 2025).

Despite a modest beginning, the relationship has grown more active in sectors related to the energy transition. Chinese companies are now prominent in infrastructure, electric mobility, solar energy, and mining (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026). The Bogotá Metro, which will run fully on electricity, is led by China Harbor Engineering Company. Chinese electric vehicle brands have quickly expanded in Colombia: from 2012 to 2019, only 1,941 electric cars were registered, with 15 percent being Chinese brands. Between 2020 and 2025, this number nearly increased tenfold to 18,824, with over 60 percent of these vehicles from Chinese brands (Díaz, 2025). Additionally, Chinese firms are key suppliers of green tech and play significant roles in developing clean energy projects (Wang, 2026). Investment in mining is smaller but still significant, with Chinese capital involved in Colombia's leading gold mine and a prospective

copper-gold project that could be central to the country's strategic minerals plan. The upcoming sections will explore these two mining projects and their implications for gender governance in Colombia's mining industry in detail.

3.2. Zijin Continental Gold and Buriticá

Zijin Continental Gold's Buriticá mine is the most important example of Chinese mining investment currently operating in Colombia. Located in the municipality of Buriticá, Antioquia, it is one of the country's most significant mining projects and the largest underground gold mine in Colombia. The mine has proven and probable reserves of 3.86 million troy ounces of gold, equivalent to around 120 tons, and one of the highest gold grades in the world (Zijin Continental Gold, 2023a; Garibello, 2020). The project was previously owned by the Canadian junior mining company Continental Gold, which sold 100 percent of its shares to Zijin Mining Group in 2020 for approximately US$1.052 billion (Zijin Mining Group Co., 2020).

Buriticá is important because it provides an early case of Chinese corporate mining governance in Colombia. It allows us to examine how a Chinese company operates within Colombia's environmental and social governance framework, how it adopts or maintains ESG practices, and how gender-related initiatives appear in practice. It also offers lessons for future Chinese investments, especially because Zijin is a global mining company with operations in copper, lithium, and gold across Latin America and beyond.

Buriticá holds significant economic importance for Colombia, contributing an estimated COP 3 trillion (around US$815 million) in royalties, taxes, and exports over 14 years of operation beginning in 2020 (Chaves, 2020; Semana, 2024). Despite this, the municipality has not received benefits proportionate to its role as a mining area. For example, although Zijin paid over US$11.49 million in royalties in 2021, Buriticá only received US$114,982. This discrepancy has led to local dissatisfaction, particularly considering the extent of gold mining and the municipality's limited fiscal and administrative resources. Additionally, Buriticá is classified as a category-six municipality, indicating it receives the smallest share of federal funds (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

The mine operates within a complex social context that long preceded Chinese ownership. In the years leading up to Canadian ownership and the expansion of the concession, Buriticá experienced a surge in mining migration, including illegal activity. The municipality nearly tripled its population, causing public services to collapse and contributing to rising crime, corruption, and a wide range of social problems (Bonilla-Calle, 2023). At the same time, illegal armed groups, heirs to paramilitary structures that had demobilized years earlier, reorganized around the area's illegal mining economy. Among these, the Clan del Golfo, Colombia´s largest armed criminal organization and drug cartel, consolidated territorial power and came to exercise unofficial political authority, imposing community rules and co-opting policymakers and social organizations, including actors in the mining sector. From the project's inception, organized crime groups had gained access to company information on the locations of gold veins, which later enabled illegal miners to penetrate the concession's subsoil via an extensive tunnel network and extract and process gold using mercury, causing serious contamination of local water bodies (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

Continental's initial response to illegal mining involved police action, which led to distrust among parts of the local community. From 2016 to 2020, the Colombian government launched a major joint military and

police operation called Control, Restructuring, Eradication, Transformation, and Authority (*Control, Reestructuración, Erradicación, Transformación y Autoridad* – CRETA) to eliminate illegal mining and restore public order to facilitate the concession's development. While this operation temporarily shut down illegal mines, it also fostered feelings of insecurity and suspicion (Lizarazo, 2023). Subsequently, Continental shifted towards formalizing mining activities by leveraging regulatory opportunities that allowed informal miners to be reclassified as "small-scale" or "traditional" miners (Jiménez et al., 2024).

Zijin acquired the project as Operation CRETA was coming to an end, but social discontent persisted. Blockades continued and, in some cases, were reportedly co-opted by illegal groups posing as informal or artisanal miners (Lizarazo, 2023). This posed a challenge to Zijin's operating model. Chinese companies often assume that the state maintains an institutional presence and guarantees security in the territories where they operate. In Buriticá, however, a weak state presence meant that social and environmental governance responsibilities increasingly fell to the company itself. The company also struggled to understand why, in conflicts involving informal mining, the state did not always prioritize dialogue with the company and, at times, appeared to support informal miners over legal mining (Parra and Márquez, 2019; DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

Beyond illegal mining, Zijin also faced challenges in its relationships with local communities. Under Continental's ownership, community relations were marked by frequent dialogue, philanthropic social development projects, and community participation. The transition to Zijin included a commitment to continue company support. On paper, Zijin claims adherence to several international frameworks, including the IFC Environmental and Social Sustainability Performance Standards, the ICMM Sustainability Framework, the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, and GRI reporting, with complementary frameworks such as SASB and TCFD (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026). In practice, however, some ESG operations were outsourced to contractors lacking direct expertise in these areas. This shift affected project operations and reduced the scope of community engagement programs (Hernández Navarro, 2024). In 2021, the Buriticá Plan, a territorial reorganization program supported by the IDB to promote local productive empowerment and integration with the company, was discontinued. This has been described as a serious tactical error in community engagement (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

Environmental issues have also raised concerns. The environmental license granted in 2016 permitted wastewater discharge into the Cauca River, the country's second most important river, prompting concerns among local communities (Tunjano, 2024). Since then, Zijin has submitted annual environmental monitoring and control reports to ANLA, which has conducted verification and control visits and ordered corrections when inconsistencies were identified (Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales [ANLA], n.d.). Infractions cited by the agency include exceeding maximum permissible discharge limits, reforesting with unsuitable tree species, and failing to ensure the survival of planted trees (Castilla & Díaz, 2022).

Despite the challenging circumstances, Zijin has worked to mend its relations with local communities and tackle illegal mining exploited by paramilitary groups. Formalizing mining operations has become a key part of its ESG strategy to build the community's economic capacity. This effort is connected to the Environmental Management Plan, allowing unlicensed miners to legalize their work and benefit from the company's formalization initiatives. The process also involves direct employment, mainly from the local

community, with a focus on female heads of households and victims of armed conflict (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026).

The most notable gender-related initiative is the formalization of women mineral sorters. In Buriticá's western region, women who manually select minerals are known as *seleccionadoras de mineral*. Many of these women work in extremely challenging conditions. Often single mothers or older women, they perform work that requires significant physical effort and carries risks. Legal mining companies typically do not permit this form of subsistence mining. However, in Buriticá, Zijin Continental has established contracts for mineral sorting, formalizing the activity by entering into agreements with five women-owned companies (Zijin, 2023b). An employee involved in the formalization project explained that women participating in the program receive social security benefits, including health and pension contributions, and support to manage the impact on their families, such as dialogue with spouses (DeFelipe and Díaz, 2026). This initiative is important because it recognizes an existing female livelihood, legalizes it, and improves working conditions. Although the process started under Continental Gold, Chinese ownership has sustained and accelerated these efforts.

Other gender-related programs have focused on entrepreneurship and local economic autonomy. The "Women Empowered Entrepreneurs" program targets women in communities around the Buriticá mine and seeks to strengthen their entrepreneurial capacity and economic independence, including as part of preparing the population for eventual mine closure. Zijin's 2024 Sustainability Report also notes 12 strengthened community-based productive organizations, the integration of a gender perspective into business practices, and a sustainable purchasing and inclusive supply chain program that has generated employment with a focus on women's inclusion (Zijin, 2024).

The Buriticá case therefore illustrates both the possibilities and limits of gender governance under Chinese mining ownership in Colombia. On the one hand, it offers concrete examples of women's livelihood formalization, entrepreneurship support, local hiring, and gender-sensitive community programming. On the other hand, these initiatives are embedded in territory marked by illegal mining, armed group influence, weak municipal capacity, environmental concerns, and a fragile relationship among the company, state, and community. Buriticá shows that Chinese ownership may maintain and extend inherited ESG or gender initiatives, but company-level programs cannot, by themselves, overcome the structural governance problems that shape mining territories.

3.3. JCHX and El Alacrán

El Alacrán represents a different phase of Chinese mining investment in Colombia. Unlike Buriticá, it is not yet operating. It is a copper-gold-silver project in Puerto Libertador, southern Córdoba, and part of the broader San Matías project. Some sources describe it as potentially the largest copper mine in Colombia. It is currently undergoing the environmental licensing process for 15 years of gold and copper exploitation, with a projected investment of around US$700 million and estimated daily production of 17,000 to 20,000 tons (La República, 2026; Gamboa, 2026).

The project is particularly relevant because copper is more directly connected to Colombia's strategic minerals agenda. In this sense, El Alacrán is a test case for whether Colombia can develop new extractive projects under a more socially, environmentally, and gender-sensitive governance framework. It is also a test case for how a Chinese mining company will operate in a territory with long histories of conflict, artisanal mining, and local claims over land and livelihoods.

JCHX gradually entered the project. In 2023, Jin Cheng Xin Mining Management Co. (JCHX) purchased a 50% stake in CMH Colombia S.A.S. for US$100 million. CMH Colombia is a subsidiary of Canadian Córdoba Minerals Corp., which owns 100% of the Alacrán copper project. To speed up development in 2025, a consortium led by JCHX bought the remaining 50% of CMH Colombia from Córdoba Minerals. This transaction gave JCHX a 55% stake in CMH and made it the sole owner of the El Alacrán project (JCHX, n.d.).

The licensing and conflict context remains delicate. After submitting its environmental license application in March 2025, the project has been undergoing environmental assessment sessions with ANLA since January 2026. Community grievances persist over unresolved issues, including relocating around 1,200 affected residents and environmental concerns related to water and forest management. The project is situated in a region with a long history of conflict and various types of mining, including artisanal and informal activities involving Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and peasant groups - a key issue in Colombia's mining sector that has caused tension between promoting large-scale mining and the traditional artisanal practices of local communities that has lasted for decades, if not centuries (Gamboa, 2026).

Compounding these complexities, the area's long tradition of artisanal mining is formally recognized under Colombian law. In 2015, Colombia's Constitutional Court ordered the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the National Environmental Licensing Authority (ANLA), and the National Mining Agency to evaluate and recognize the traditional character of the mining community in the El Alacrán territory (Corte Constitucional de Colombia, 2015). More recently, the Ministry of Mines and Energy issued Resolution 40141 of 2025, which explicitly defines and protects small-scale mining and establishes a structured framework for its formalization and legalization (Ministerio de Minas y Energía, 2025b). Consequently, local artisanal miners—including women, who form a distinct part of this labor ecosystem—are legally entitled to expanded protections, giving them greater leverage in negotiating corporate-community relations with JCHX.

JCHX's sustainability framework for El Alacrán is still developing. Unlike Buriticá, where at least some women-focused initiatives are identifiable, El Alacrán remains a case where gender is not yet visible in the public record. The company operates across mining services, mine engineering, construction, and operations management, with projects in Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Serbia, and China. It has been listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange since 2015. JCHX produced its first sustainability report in 2024 for the 2023 reporting year and has since published a second report covering 2024 and 2025. These reports claim to follow the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards, the Shanghai Stock Exchange's sustainability reporting guidelines, and the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals mapping, but they provide little information on its operations in Colombia (JCHX, 2026).

El Alacrán's significance lies less in showcasing established gender practices than in highlighting a crucial governance opportunity. Although the project has not started operations, key issues such as relocation, environmental management, artisanal mining formalization, community involvement, and job opportunities are already emerging. These areas are where gender-sensitive planning is most vital. Without early attention to women's livelihoods, care duties, participation, compensation, and access to formalization, gender inequalities risk becoming entrenched in the project's social and environmental structures.

4. Gaps, Risks, and Opportunities

The intersection of gender, Chinese investment, and mining governance is still only partially visible in Colombia. There is a growing body of evidence on gender in Colombia's mining and energy territories, especially around coal, mine closure, labor markets, and community participation. There is also a growing literature on Chinese investment in Colombia's infrastructure, energy, and mining sectors. What remains limited is the evidence that brings these strands together. Gendered impacts are not absent, but systematic documentation of how they are shaped when Chinese companies become owners, operators, financiers, or contractors in mining and energy-transition-related projects is lacking.

A major challenge has been the gap between policy discourse and actual project implementation. Colombia has advanced in acknowledging gender equality in the mining-energy sector through sector-specific guidelines, voluntary corporate actions, and the discourse around a just energy transition under former president Gustavo Petro. Nonetheless, this recognition did not become an obligatory operational standard in areas like environmental licensing, community consultations, resettlement, formalization efforts, local procurement, closure plans, or benefit-sharing arrangements. These tools are crucial because they define mining regions. Without making gender a mandatory requirement rather than just a principle, women's participation and livelihoods might remain contingent on company choices or civil society influence, rather than on enforceable governance systems.

Looking ahead under the administration of Abelardo De La Espriella, the integration of gender equity into mining governance faces a shift toward deregulation and market-driven development. De La Espriella's conservative, pro-business agenda prioritizes investor security, accelerated environmental licensing, and a rollback of Petro-era social mandates—a framework that risks further marginalizing voluntary gender guidelines in favor of rapid capital extraction. In this regulatory climate, enforced gender mainstreaming in mining consultations and local procurement is unlikely to become a state priority; instead, gender-inclusive practices will depend almost entirely on individual corporate standards, local civil society advocacy, or the transnational standards required by foreign operators.

Chinese investment adds complexity to the situation. The Buriticá case indicates that Chinese ownership does not automatically negate existing ESG or gender-related practices. Zijin preserved and even expanded some initiatives from Continental Gold, such as formalizing women mineral sorters and programs promoting women's entrepreneurship and local economic autonomy. This highlights that Chinese companies cannot be broadly labeled as indifferent or weak on gender issues. However, Buriticá also reveals the limitations of company-led programs in areas affected by illegal mining, armed groups, weak local governments, environmental issues, and fragile trust among the company, authorities, and community.

El Alacrán poses a unique risk and opportunity. Unlike Buriticá, it is not yet operational, allowing gender-sensitive governance to be integrated before crucial arrangements are finalized. Key issues such as relocation, environmental management, formalization of artisanal mining, local employment, procurement, and community participation are already emerging. These are not just social concerns; they will influence who benefits from the project, who bears its costs, and whose livelihoods are acknowledged. Without early mapping of women's roles in artisanal mining, informal services, care work, local organizations, and community leadership, the project risks reinforcing existing exclusions before they become evident in formal metrics.

The main risk, then, is not only that future projects will exclude women from mining jobs. It is that strategic mineral development may reproduce older extractive patterns under a new energy-transition vocabulary. Colombia's just transition framework under the Petro government created an opening to do things differently, but that opening is not automatic. The language of justice, participation, and sustainability can coexist with gender-blind project design if institutions do not require concrete implementation mechanisms. Future Chinese mining and renewable energy projects could deepen existing inequalities if they enter territories through the usual channels: negotiations with male leaders, household-level compensation, employment programs focused on formal workers, and social investment projects disconnected from women's actual economic roles.

The opportunity is that Colombia is still early in the development of Chinese mining investment. Compared with Peru, where Chinese companies already operate several major mines and governance patterns are more established, Colombia still has room to build expectations before new projects mature. Gender can be addressed not only through corporate diversity policies but also through territorial planning, formalization, local procurement, environmental monitoring, and community development. The challenge is to connect existing knowledge on gendered mining territories with concrete requirements for companies, state institutions, and local actors. Without that connection, gender will remain visible in policy language but weak in the actual governance of mining and energy-transition projects.

5. Recommendations

The Colombian case points to a practical agenda for integrating gender earlier and more concretely into the governance of Chinese mining investment. The goal is not to create a separate gender track disconnected from mining policy, but to make gender part of the instruments that already govern mining territories: licensing, consultation, formalization, local procurement, closure planning, and community development.

First, navigating a more market-driven policy environment under the De La Espriella administration. If regulatory enforcement by the state becomes more relaxed or licensing procedures become faster, promoting gender-inclusive governance can be achieved by embedding gender criteria into investment agreements, corporate social responsibility initiatives, and investor ESG benchmarks. In this setting, civil society groups and local authorities may refer to international standards to exert pressure to investors and maintain social and gender-sensitive safeguards.

Second, Colombian public institutions should incorporate gender-sensitive requirements into the governance of mining and the energy transition. Environmental impact assessments and environmental management plans should identify gender-differentiated impacts on employment, livelihoods, water use, health, care responsibilities, mobility, and community participation. These assessments should not only count women participants in meetings but also evaluate whether women's concerns are reflected in mitigation measures, monitoring indicators, budgets, and follow-up mechanisms.

Third, consultation and participation processes should be designed around women's actual conditions of participation. Meetings should be scheduled at accessible times and locations, with information provided in clear language and, where relevant, local languages. Separate preparatory spaces for women may be necessary before formal assemblies, especially in communities where male leaders dominate public deliberation. Authorities and companies should track not only how many women attend meetings, but

who speaks, whose proposals are incorporated, and whether women participate in monitoring and implementation committees.

Fourth, formalization policies need to acknowledge women's involvement in artisanal, informal, and indirect mining sectors. Cases like coal closures and Buriticá highlight that many women's livelihoods are overlooked in official employment figures. In projects such as El Alacrán, where artisanal mining is deeply rooted in local territories, formalization efforts should target not only male miners or title holders but also women engaged in mineral sorting, food services, small businesses, transport, caregiving, and other local economic activities linked to mining. These policies should promote access to social security, training programs, safety standards, credit, and collective business support.

Fifth, Chinese companies should develop site-specific gender strategies that extend beyond workforce diversity. These strategies should cover direct employment, subcontracting, local procurement, community relations, resettlement, grievance mechanisms, and closure planning. Companies should publish gender-disaggregated data not only for direct workers but also for contractors, training programs, local suppliers, and community beneficiaries. When companies inherit prior ESG commitments through acquisitions, as in Buriticá, they should maintain and strengthen them rather than narrow community engagement after ownership transitions.

Sixth, companies should link women's economic empowerment programs to real project value chains. Training, entrepreneurship, and productive projects are useful only when they connect to actual procurement opportunities, service contracts, or markets. Camp management, food services, laundry, cleaning, environmental monitoring, restoration, and other local logistics can create opportunities for women-led businesses if companies design procurement systems intentionally. Otherwise, women's programs risk remaining philanthropic and disconnected from the local economy, which is often dominated by the mining project.

Seventh, lenders, industry associations, and international partners should make gender part of ESG due diligence for Chinese mining and energy-transition projects. Gender action plans should include baseline diagnostics, measurable indicators, assigned responsibilities, budgets, timelines, and community verification mechanisms. International partners can also support independent gender audits, technical training on environmental licensing, and peer learning among communities affected by mining, coal closure, and renewable energy projects.

Finally, research institutions and civil society should continue to build evidence on the gendered impacts of mining and the energy transition in Colombia. More longitudinal and mixed-methods research is needed on women in indirect economies, informal mining, mine closure, relocation, subcontracted work, and local leadership. This is especially urgent in territories where new strategic mineral projects are being developed. The aim should be to generate evidence before projects are fully operating, so that gender-sensitive governance can shape decisions rather than merely document harms after they occur.

6. Conclusion

Colombia offers a significant case for understanding gender issues and Chinese investment in mining. Chinese firms are entering a sector long shaped by fossil fuel extractions, informal mining, armed conflict, and limited state presence. While their role is smaller than in Peru or Argentina, projects like Buriticá and El Alacrán highlight that Chinese investments are increasingly relevant to Colombia's

mining and energy transition plans. Buriticá demonstrates that Chinese ownership can uphold and even expand gender-related ESG practices, yet company initiatives are still hindered by broader governance issues. El Alacrán emphasizes the importance of addressing gender before project agreements become fixed. Colombia has the opportunity to act proactively—integrating gender considerations into licensing, consultation, formalization, local procurement, and community development from the start could help prevent repeating past inequalities. Failure to do so risks undermining the goals of a just energy transition with familiar patterns of exclusion.

Bibliography

Ángel, A. (2019). *Impactos a perpetuidad. El legado de la minería*. https://co.boell.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/20191009_ideasverdes_20_web.pdf

Arond, E., Vega-Araújo, J., Peña-Niño, J., y Patzy, F. (2024). *Just transitions from coal in Colombia: Between policy and reality*. Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). https://www.sei.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/just-transitions-coal-colombia-policy-reality-sei2024-038.pdf

Asociación Colombiana de Minería. (n.d.). *Galardón HuEllas: Reconociendo el papel de la mujer en la minería colombiano*. https://acmineria.com.co/galardon-huellas/

Autoridad Nacional de Licencias Ambientales [ANLA]. (n.d.). *PIS - Proyecto Aurífero Buritica*. Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. https://www.anla.gov.co/proyectos-de-interes-en-seguimiento/pis-proyecto-aurifero-buritica

Baraybar Hidalgo, V., & Dargent, E. (2020). State responses to the gold rush in the Andes (2004–2018): The politics of state action (and inaction). *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *55*(4), 516–537. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-020-09314-5

Barry, J. M. (2012). *Standing Our Ground: Women, Environmental Justice, and the Fight to End Mountaintop Removal* (1st ed). Ohio University Press.

Bermúdez-Rico, R., Rodríguez-Maldonado, T., y Roa-Avendaño, T. (2012, Junio 4). *Mujer y minería: Ámbitos de análisis e impactos de la minería en la vida de las mujeres - Enfoque de derechos y perspectiva de género*. Censat Agua Viva. https://censat.org/mujer-y-mineria-ambitos-de-analisis-e-impactos-de-la-mineria-en-la-vida-de-las-mujeres-enfoque-de-derechos-y-perspectiva-de-genero/

Bermúdez-Rico, R., Zambrano-Corredor, K., y Roa-Avendaño, T. (2014, Julio 4). *Los territorios, la minería y nosotras: Las mujeres nos preguntamos. Guía de trabajo*. Censat Agua Viva. https://justiciaambientalcolombia.org/los-territorios-la-mineria-y-nosotras-las-mujeres-nos-preguntamos-guia-de-trabajo/

Castilla, M. J., & Diaz Lizcano, W. (2022). Evaluación de los elementos del plan de compensación por pérdida de biodiversidad de la Mina Buriticá de la compañía Zijin Continental Gold, que contribuyen con la sostenibilidad ambiental del ecosistema Zonobioma alterno hígrico subxerofitico; Estudio d… [Escuela de Ingeniería]. https://repository.upb.edu.co/handle/20.500.11912/10621

Bonilla-Calle, D. (2023). Caracterización de actores en la minería del oro en Buriticá y el Bajo Cauca antioqueño. Revista Científica General José María Córdova, 21(41), 201–221. https://doi.org/10.21830/19006586.997

Chaves, M. (2020, octubre 23). Buriticá generará $3 billones en impuestos y regalías a la Nación durante 14 años. La República. Recuperado de: https://www.larepublica.co/empresas/buritica-generara-3-billones-a-la-nacion-3078262

Cifuentes-Guerrero, J. y Güiza-Suárez, L. (2021, Agosto 25). El rosto de la mujer minera en Colombia: un análisis a partir del enfoque de género. *Cuadernos de Desarrollo Rural*, *18*. https://revistas.javeriana.edu.co/files-articulos/CDR/18 (2021)/11768326005/

Cock, J. (2019). Resistance to coal inequalities and the possibilities of a just transition in South Africa. *Development Southern Africa*, *36*(6), 860–873. https://doi.org/10.1080/0376835X.2019.1660859

Colombia Risk Analysis. (2023). Informe especial: Percepciones locales sobre la inversión china en Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia: Colombia Risk Analysis. https://www.colombiariskanalysis.com/post/percepciones-locales-sobre-la-inversión-china-en-colombia.

Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social. (2022, 29 de marzo). *CONPES 4075: Política de Transición Energética*. Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Econ%C3%B3micos/4075.pdf

Corte Constitucional de Colombia. (2015, 4 de marzo). *Sentencia T-095/15* (M.P. Gloria Stella Ortiz Delgado). https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2015/t-095-15.htm

Daggett, C. (2018). Petro-masculinity: Fossil Fuels and Authoritarian Desire. *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, *47*(1), 25–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0305829818775817

Daggett, C. (2021). Energy and domination: Contesting the fossil myth of fuel expansion. *Environmental Politics*, *30*(4), 644–662. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2020.1807204

DeFelipe, C., & Díaz, J. (2026). América Latina, China y una transición energética justa: el caso de Colombia (América Latina, China y una Transición Energética Justa: Serie de Documentos de Trabajo). Universidad del Pacífico Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia-Pacífico, Boston University Global Development Policy Center. https://doi.org/10.21678/cechap.2026.jet.dt11

Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE). (s.f.). Balanza comercial. *DANE*. Recuperado de https://www.dane.gov.co/index.php/estadisticas-por-tema/comercio-internacional/balanza-comercial

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). (2023, Diciembre 21). *Política Nacional de Reindustrialización*. https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/4129.pdf

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). (2022, Abril 18). *Política Pública de Equidad de Género para las Mujeres: Hacia el Desarrollo Sostenible del País*. https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/4080.pdf

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). (2022, Marzo 29). *Política de Transición Energética*. https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Conpes/Económicos/4075.pdf

Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP). (2008). *Ley 1257 de 2008*. Función Pública. https://www.funcionpublica.gov.co/eva/gestornormativo/norma.php?i=34054

Díaz, A. (2025, September 28). *The energy transition in Colombia is "Made in China* ". El Espectador. https://www.elespectador.com/ambiente/la-transicion-energetica-en-colombia-es-made-in-china/

Dussel Peters, E. (2025). Monitor de la OFDI china en América Latina y el Caribe 2025. https://redalc-china.org/monitor/historico-de-ejemplares-del-monitor/

EITI Colombia. (2025). *Informe Contextual EITI Colombia 2022*. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/INFORME_CONTEXTUAL_EITI_UV.pdf?hash=1764%2006840 0

Fondo de Energías No Convencionales y Gestión Eficiente de la Energía (FENOGE). (2022, Mayo 23). *Política de Equidad de Género y Diversidad*. FENOGE. https://fenoge.gov.co/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Politica-Genero-y-Diversidad-del-FENOGE.pdf

Gamboa, E. (2026) El Alacrán, la mina de cobre que avanza sin acuerdos comunitarios. *Revista Raya.* 23 Feb. https://revistaraya.com/el-alacran-la-mina-de-cobre-que-avanza-sin-acuerdos-comunitarios.html

Garibello, A. (2020, octubre 21). Buriticá Gold Project, Antioquia Province, Colombia. Forbes. Recuperado de: https://www.nsenergybusiness.com/projects/buritica-gold-project/?cf-view

Gilbert, J. E., Gilbertson, T., & Jakobsen, L. (2021). Incommensurability and corporate social technologies: A critique of corporate compensations in Colombia's coal mining region of La Guajira. *Journal of Political Ecology*, *28*. https://doi.org/10.2458/jpe.2952

González Colonia, C. J. (2017). *Brujería, minería tradicional y capitalismo transnacional en los Andes Colombianos*. Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia. https://www.librerialerner.com.co/brujeria-mineria-tradicional-y-capitalismo-transnacional-en-los-andes-colombianos-9789588852393-3438/p

Hernández Navarro, R.I. (2024). Lecciones aprendidas del proyecto minero Buriticá de Zijin–Continental Gold. Universidad EAFIT. https://hdl.handle.net/10784/35032

Holguín, G. (2020). *Reasentamiento de El Hatillo, Cesar: La asímetria en la concertación entre comunidades y empresas mineras*. https://www.pas.org.co/investigacion-el-hatillo

Hylton, F. (2021) 'What is history? Reflections from the edge of empires, nation-states, and disciplines'. Dialect Anthropol 45, pp. 333–355.

Jakobsen, L. J. (2024). Extractive subjectivity in a corporate coal mining site in Colombia. *Geoforum*, *148*, 103605. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2022.07.007

Insuco. (2020, November). *Lanzamiento del Comité Consultivo Energía Que Transforma, en alianza con el Ministerio de Minas y Energía de Colombia y el BID*. https://www.insuco.com/es/lanzamiento-del-comite-consultivo-energia-que-transforma-en-alianza-con-el-ministerio-de-minas-y-energia-de-colombia-y-el-bid/

Jiménez, A. D., Smith, N. M., & Holley, E. A. (2024). Towards sustainable ASM-based livelihoods: The role of institutional arrangements in the formalization of artisanal and small-scale mining. *Resources Policy*, *94*, 105129.

JCHX Mining Management Co., Ltd. (n.d.). *Company profile* [Corporate profile]. Retrieved from:

https://www.jchxmc.com/?about_109.html

JCHX Mining Management Co., Ltd. (2026). *ESG & Corporate Social Responsibility Reports* [Data portal]. http://www.jchxmc.com/?list_199.html

Karlsson, E. (2023). *Resilience in Action. An Exploration of the Motivations of Wayúu Indigenous Women Human Rights Defenders in their Endeavor to Safeguard their Rights in La Guajira, Colombia* [Master's Thesis]. Lund Universitet.

Lahiri-Dutt, K. (2022). New directions in research on women and gender in extractive industries. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 9(101048).

La República. (2026, 22 de mayo). *"Invertiremos cerca de US$700 millones en la construcción del proyecto de El Alacrán"*. https://www.larepublica.co/empresas/invertiremos-cerca-de-us-700-millones-en-la-construccion-de-la-mina-el-alacran-4397472

Lizarazo, M. (2023, March 29). *Zijin's difficult days in Buriticá*. Dialogue Earth. https://dialogue.earth/en/justice/54228-zijins-difficult-days-in-buritica/

Mariño Miranda, C. F., Carrasco Rincón, E., & Sánchez Delgado, S. F. (2024). *Anexo 4 – Minerales estratégicos: Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Minero 2024 - 2035*. Unidad de Planeación Minero Energética (UPME); Ministerio de Minas y Energía. https://docs.upme.gov.co/SIMEC/simco/PlaneacionSector/Documents/Anexo_4_Minerales_estrategicos_PNDM.pdf

Martínez-Restrepo, S., Hernández, J., y Botello, S. (2022, Marzo 12). *Estudio Sectorial de Equidad de Género para el Sector Minero Energético*. IADB Publications. https://publications.iadb.org/es/estudio-sectorial-de-equidad-de-genero-para-el-sector-minero-energetico

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2018, Agosto 2). *Resolución número 40796 de 2018, por medio de la cual se adopta la Política de Derechos Humanos del Sector Minero Energético*. vLex. https://vlex.com.co/vid/resolucion-numero-4-0796-736328729

Ministerio de Minas y Energía y Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID). (2020, Marzo). *Lineamientos de género para el Sector Minero Energético*. https://www.minenergia.gov.co/documents/5800/Lineamientos-de-pol%C3%ADtica-p%C3%BAblica-con-enfoque-de-g%C3%A9nero-del-sector-minero-energ%C3%A9tico.pdf

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2022). *Informe Contextual EITI Colombia 2022*. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/INFORME_CONTEXTUAL_EITI_UV.pdf?hash=1764%20068400

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2023a, agosto 31). *Colombia nuevo amigo de la alianza internacional "Más Allá del Petróleo y el Gas-BOGA"*. https://www.minenergia.gov.co/es/sala-de-prensa/noticias-index/colombia-nuevo-amigo-de-la-alianza-internacional-más-allá-del-petróleo-y-el-gas-boga/

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2023b). *Sistematización diálogos nacionales: Hoja de ruta de la transición energética justa en Colombia*. Gobierno de Colombia. https://www.minenergia.gov.co/documents/10438/1._Sistematizaci%C3%B3n_de_los_Di%C3%A1logos_Nacionales.pdf

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2025a). *Hoja de Ruta para la Transición Energética Justa de Colombia*. https://minenergia.gov.co/documents/13272/Hoja_de_ruta_transicion_energetica_justa_TEJ_2025.pdf

Ministerio de Minas y Energía. (2025b, 3 de abril). *Resolución 40141 de 2025. Por medio de la cual se establecen lineamientos para adoptar criterios de diferenciación de los mineros informales de pequeña escala con vocación de formalización y en tránsito a la formalización y mecanismos para el tratamiento diferencial para la formalización y la titulación minera*. Sistema Único de Información Normativa -SISJUR. https://sisjur.bogotajuridica.gov.co/sisjur/normas/Norma1.jsp?i=179539&dt=S

Mohr, K. (2021). Breaking the Dichotomies: Climate, Coal, and Gender. Paving the Way to a Just Transition. The Example of Colombia. *Energies*, *14*(17). https://doi.org/10.3390/en14175457

Mohr, K., Thema, J., Bonet, M., y Vasudha, V. (2023, Agosto). *Transición Energética Justa en Colombia: Status Quo, Retos y Oportunidades. Una evaluación centrada en las regiones carboníferas de los departamentos de Cesar y La Guajira*. JET Knowledge. https://www.jetknowledge.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/20231016_AF-Colombia_final_ES_v1.pdf

Moor, M., & van de Sandt, J. (2014). *El lado oscuro del carbón. La violencia paramilitar en la zona minera del Cesaro, Colombia*. Pax for Peace. https://paxforpeace.nl/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/import/import/pax-el-lado-oscuro-del-carbon-v3.pdf

Observatory of Economic Complexity. (2024). *China (CHN) and Colombia (COL) bilateral trade product profile (HS2)*.https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/chn/partner/col?selector538id=HS2&selector1792id=pctOption&selector541id=2024

Oei, P.-Y., Brauers, H., & Herpich, P. (2020). Lessons from Germany's hard coal mining phase-out: Policies and transition from 1950 to 2018. Climate Policy, 20(8), 963–979. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1688636 Pan, J. (2021). *China's Global Vision for Ecological Civilization: Theoretical Construction and Practical Research on Building Ecological Civilization*. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-4534-1

Pasaribu, D., & Lahiri-Dutt, K. (2022). Coal reliance, human development, and gender equality: At what scale should we look for a relationship? *Energy Research & Social Science*, *90*, 102612. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102612

Parra, A.R.R., & Márquez, W.M. (2019). Gobierno privado del oro en Colombia. El caso del municipio de Buriticá, Antioquia. Estudios Políticos, 54, 15–36. https://doi.org/10.17533/UDEA.ESPO.N54A02

Quiceno, J. C. (2024b, junio 14). Más de 80 empresas chinas operan en Colombia y la inversión se disparó desde 2019. La República. Recuperado de: https://www.larepublica.co/empresas/cuantas-empresas-chinas-operan-actualmente-en-colombia-3880382

Semana. (2024, febrero 17). *Esta mina generará cerca de 3 billones de pesos en impuestos y regalías durante 14 años de operación en Colombia*. Semana. https://www.semana.com/mejor-colombia/articulo/esta-mina-generara-cerca-de-3-billones-de-pesos-en-impuestos-y-regalias-durante-14-anos-de-operacion-en-colombia/202444/

Sikweyiya, Y., Nkosi, S., Langa, M., Operario, D., & Lurie, M. N. (2022). "You see this thing is hard… ey, this thing is painful": The burden of the provider role and construction of masculinities amongst Black male mineworkers in Marikana, South Africa. *PLOS ONE*, *17*(5), e0268227. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0268227

Sovacool, B. K., Martiskainen, M., Hook, A., & Baker, L. (2020). Beyond cost and carbon: The multidimensional co-benefits of low carbon transitions in Europe. *Ecological Economics*, *169*, 106529. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106529

Torres, R. (2024). *Estado de los planes de cierre de las minas de carbón en Guajira-Cesar*. https://justtransition.cnvinternationaal.nl/_Resources/Persistent/3/2/2/2/3222f4da4e1c6964874292ec7c6209f3cadd22ca/CONSULTORIA%20PARA%20CNV%20INTERNACIONAL%20-%20entrega%20final-%20%20%281%29.pdf

Tunjano Gutiérrez, A. C. (2024). Conflicto socioambiental por la disponibilidad y acceso al agua comprometido en megaminería aurífera en Buriticá, Antioquia, Colombia. 1. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/tesis?codigo=365728&info=resumen&idioma=CAT

Ulloa, A. (2016). Feminismos territoriales en América Latina: Defensas de la vida frente a los extractivismos. *Nómadas (Col)*, (45), 123–139. https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/1051/105149483020.pdf

Ulloa, A. (2020). Ecología política feminista latinoamericana. En A. De Luca, E. Fosado, y M. Velásquez (Coords.). *Feminismo socioambiental. Revitalizando el debate desde América Latina* (pp. 75–104). UNAM. https://we.riseup.net/assets/711398/Ulloa-Astrid-2020-ECOLOGIA-POLITICA-FEMINISTA-LATINOAMERICANA.pdf

Unidad de Planeación Minero-Energética. (n.d.). *Formación en enfoque de género UPME*. Ministerio de Minas y Energía; Estrategia Territorio Vivo. https://www.upme.gov.co/home/territorio-vivo/formacion-enfoque-genero/

Vargas-Guevara, Ó., Corral-Montoya, F., Cardoso-Díaz, A., Ruiz-Arrollave, J., Bonilla-Camargo, Ó., Gómez-Camargo, M., López-Orellano, L., Brito-Bouriyu, L., Guzmán-Angulo, N., Padilla-Guzmán, N., Soto-Sierra, M., Ortiz-Bouriyu, Y., y Malz, N. (2022). *Impulsos desde abajo para las transiciones energéticas justas: Género, territorio y soberanía*. Editorial Unimagdalena, Fundación Friedrich-Ebert-Stifting Colombia. https://doi.org/10.21676/9789587464689

Vega-Araújo, J., Peña Niño, J., Arond, E., y Patzy, F. (2023, Diciembre 22). *Navigating a just energy transition from coal in the Colombian Caribbean*. SEI Working Paper. Stockhol Environment Institute. https://doi.org/10.51414/sei2023.063

Velicu, I., & Barca, S. (2020). The Just Transition and its work of inequality. *Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy*, *16*(1), 263–273. https://doi.org/10.1080/15487733.2020.1814585

Velosa, E. (2019). A tale of should be but is not: The political and economic drivers of limited Chinese investments in Colombia. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24(4), 643–663. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09589-5

Verweijen, J., Himley, M., & Frederiksen, T. (2024). Unearthing extractive subjects: Power and subjectivity at the extractive frontier. *Geoforum*, *148*, 103917. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2023.103917

Villamizar, R. M., & Jerez, A. M. (2020). *Industrial Mining and Social Investment in Santurbán: Reflections from a Gender Decolonial Approach*. (1), 30–46.

Wang, K. (2026). From minerals to megawatts: Understanding Chinese involvement in Latin America's renewable energy value chain (Latin America, China and a Just Energy Transition: Working Paper Series). Universidad del Pacífico Centro de Estudios sobre China y Asia-Pacífico, Boston University Global Development Policy Center. https://doi.org/10.21678/cechap.2026.jet.dt2

Watson, T., Lenton, T., & De Campos, R. S. (2023). The climate change, conflict and migration nexus: A holistic view. *Climate Resilience and Sustainability*, *2*(2), e250. https://doi.org/10.1002/cli2.50

Zijin Mining Group Co., Ltd. (2020, marzo 6). Zijin completes acquisition of Continental Gold–Media Coverage. Zijin Mining. https://www.zijinmining.com/news/media-detail-119051.htm

Zijin Continental Gold. (2023a). Reserva y recursos minerales–Zijin–Continental Gold. Continental Gold. Recuperado de: https://www.continentalgold.com/mina-buritica/reserva-y-recursos-minerales/

Zijin-Continental Gold. (2023b, January 5). *Mujeres Seleccionadoras de Mineral de Buriticá, un ejemplo de formalización* [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uei8tfEJH_I

Zijin. (2024). *2024 Sustainability Report* . https://www.continentalgold.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Zijin_CG_%20Informe%20de%20Sostenibilidad%202024_GRI.pdf